Abstract
Introduction
It is important to note that the United Kingdom (the UK)'s market abuse 1 regime has a separate and specific statute that deals with insider trading 2 and another statute which broadly deals with market manipulation and other related market abuse activities. 3 The market abuse legislation in the UK has further been carefully formulated to incorporate some of the provisions of the 2003 European Directive 4 on market abuse. 5 Consequently, this broad and extensive regulatory approach has led countries in other jurisdictions, 6 including South Africa, 7 to follow some of the enforcement approaches of the UK's market abuse regime, especially with regard to the prohibition on insider trading. 8 It is against this background that this article will, where applicable, undertake a comparative analysis of the market abuse prohibition in the UK and South Africa to explore their similarities and differences. To this end, a general historical overview of the insider trading legislation will be discussed first, followed by a similar discussion on the prohibition of market manipulation practices. Lastly, the available penalties will be discussed and thereafter, possible recommendations and/or concluding remarks will be provided.
of their employment or office. 28 Secondly, the Criminal Justice Act prohibits an individual (secondary insider) who obtains non-public inside information either directly or indirectly from a primary insider from committing insider trading offences. 29 Lastly, the Criminal Justice Act further discourages any secondary insider's tippees from indulging in insider trading. 30 Furthermore, the Criminal Justice Act prohibits individuals from engaging in approximately three forms of conduct that would amount to insider trading. Firstly, individuals are prohibited from dealing in price-affected securities on the basis of non-public material inside information. 31 Secondly, individuals are prohibited from encouraging (tipping) other persons to deal in price-affected securities on the basis of non-public material inside information. 32 Lastly, the Criminal Justice Act prohibits individuals from knowingly and improperly disclosing non-public material inside information to other persons. 33 No individual (insider) may be convicted of insider trading unless he knew that he was in possession of nonpublic inside information and dealt in the affected securities on the basis of such information.
Although the Criminal Justice Act introduced a number of significant changes such as a wider definition of securities, 34 its provisions are still flawed in some respects. For instance, its prohibition may only give rise to criminal sanctions against individuals who practise insider trading. Put differently, the definition of "individual" only covers unincorporated partnerships or corporations comprising a collection of individuals. 35 This is arguably one of the main weaknesses of the insider trading ban contained in the Criminal Justice Act. 36 Moreover, individuals will only be liable for insider trading when they deal in affected securities on a regulated market or where such dealing is conducted on the over the counter markets through a professional intermediary. 37 Apart from the Criminal Justice Act, the insider trading practice is also indirectly prohibited in the Companies Act 2006. 38 For instance, the directors of a company are prohibited from accepting benefits from third parties 39 and dealing in such company's securities if they have a direct or indirect interest that contradicts the interests of the company, especially with regard to their use of privileged inside information to avoid possible conflicts of interests and/or insider trading. 40 Moreover, circumstances in which a company can deal in its own securities or capital to repurchase, cancel stock, or redeem preference shares are carefully regulated to prevent the abuse of non-public price-sensitive information through insider trading. 41
Evaluation and Analysis of the Historical Overview of Insider Trading Prohibition
In contrast to the developments of the regulation and enforcement of the insider trading ban in the UK, 42 the legislature in South Africa introduced a prohibition on insider trading in 1973. 43 However, both South Africa and the UK's insider trading regulatory frameworks prohibit individuals from committing insider trading offences, especially in relation to securities listed on regulated financial markets. 44 Moreover, both South Africa 45 and the UK's 46 insider trading regulatory frameworks prohibit primary insiders, secondary insiders and their tippees from knowingly dealing directly or indirectly 47 in securities on the basis of non-public price-sensitive (material) inside information for their own benefit or for the benefit of
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. 30 S 57. Also see generally Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 47. 31 S 52(1) . 32 S 52(2) (a) . 33 S 52(2)(b) others. 48 Unlike in the UK, 49 there is no express provision that discourages dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter markets through agents or professional intermediaries in South Africa. 50 This could be due to the fact that insider trading activities in the over the counter markets are probably very restricted since such transactions are mostly done on a face-to-face basis between persons who know each other quite well. Furthermore, although the words "through an agent" are used in some provisions that discourage insider trading under the Financial Markets Act, 51 this Act does not expressly provide a statutory definition for the term "agent". 52 On the contrary, the term "professional intermediary" which is similar to the term "agent" is employed and fully defined in the UK. 53 Notably, the South African insider trading ban has an unlimited extra-territorial application. Thus, in contrast to the UK's insider trading regime which only applies to any dealing that takes place on a regulated market which operates in the UK or if the person dealing in the price-affected securities is a professional intermediary or relies on a professional intermediary to deal in such securities on a regulated financial market in the UK, 54 an insider who unlawfully deals in the South African securities listed on a foreign market can be prosecuted for insider trading in South Africa even if the territorial (nexus) link to South Africa does not exist. 55 Furthermore, unlike the position in the Criminal Justice Act, 56 insider trading is treated both as a civil and criminal offence in South Africa. 57 Nevertheless, no attempt has been made to statutorily define the concept of insider trading in both South Africa 58 and the UK. 59
Historical Overview of Market Manipulation Prohibition
Notwithstanding the fact that market abuse also constitutes insider trading activity, 60 this sub-heading will mainly discuss market manipulation and other forms of market abuse that do not necessarily amount to insider trading.
Market manipulation and other related market abuse activities have been statutorily prohibited in the UK, probably since the early 1860s. 61 The initial attempt to prohibit market manipulation in the UK was made by the Larceny Act 1861. This Act criminalised fraudulent misrepresentations intended to create a false market. 62 The second attempt to regulate market manipulation in the UK was possibly introduced under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939. 63 However, this Act was repealed by the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. 64 The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 prohibited dishonest concealment of material non-public inside information relating to any securities for personal gain or the benefit of others. 65 However, its purported market abuse ban was extremely difficult to enforce, especially where the wrongful conduct was committed outside the UK.
As a result the legislature enacted a new market manipulation prohibition under the Financial Services Act. 66 A two-fold market manipulation prohibition was formulated under the Financial Services Act. Firstly, it prohibited the making of misleading statements or concealment of material non-public inside information relating to any securities. 67 Secondly, the Financial Services Act prohibited the perpetration of market manipulation through misleading conduct or practices. 68 The market manipulation prohibition under the Financial Services Act was, however, flawed in some areas. For instance, it failed to obtain more convictions against the market manipulation offenders. This could have been triggered by its heavy reliance on the criminal sanctions alone to combat market manipulation or similar market abuse activities. 69 In order to improve and align the UK's market abuse legislation with the international best standards, the legislature enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act. 70 The Financial Services and Markets Act came into effect on 1 December 2001. This Act defined and treated market manipulation and other market abuse practices both as criminal and civil offences. The initial civil provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act discouraged three conducts, namely the misuse of information, the making or publishing of false or misleading impressions and market distortion or manipulation. 71 These provisions were extensively revised on 1 July 2005 after the adoption of the Treasury's Market Abuse 72 and Investment Recommendation (Media) Regulations 73 to implement the EU Market Abuse Directive 74 and its so-called Level 2 Implementing Measures. 75 The new civil provisions under the Financial Services and Markets Act provided a broader and comprehensive definition of various conducts that could amount to market manipulation and other related market abuse practices. 76 These provisions also retained civil offences for engaging in conduct that will give rise to the misuse of material inside information 77 and creation of a false or misleading impression or distortion of the financial markets. 78 The new civil offence under the Financial Services and Markets Act is now applicable to both natural and juristic persons. 79 Moreover, this civil offence need only be proved on the balance of probabilities. It is not necessary to prove intention on the part of the alleged offenders; negligent action or inaction may be sufficient for such offenders to incur liability. 80 In addition, as earlier indicated, there are seven types of market abuse practices in the UK and these practices will each now be briefly discussed. Firstly, insider dealing 81 is expressly outlawed in the Financial Services and Markets Act. Consequently, any person or insider who deals or attempts to deal in qualifying and related investments on the basis of non-public price-sensitive inside information relating to the investments in question will incur civil liability under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 82 Secondly, improper disclosure is also prohibited in the Financial Services and Markets Act. Accordingly, the disclosure of non-public price-sensitive information by an insider or any individual to another person in instances other than for the proper performance of his employment, profession or duties will give rise to a civil offence on the part of that individual under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 83 Thirdly, any misuse of information is discouraged under the Financial Services and Markets Act. Therefore, conduct based on information that is not generally available but that would affect the decision of the investors to deal or not to deal in certain qualifying investments could amount to market manipulation or other market abuse offences. 84 Such conduct must also be based on information which a "regular user" 85 of the market or the person in the position of the alleged offender would consider relevant in determining the terms on which to deal before civil liability can be imputed against any accused persons. 86 Fourthly, manipulating transactions are further prohibited in the Financial Services and Markets Act. As a result, any behaviour or dealing that gives a false or misleading impression of the supply of or demand for one or more investments to raise the price of the investments in question to abnormal or artificial levels amounts to a civil offence of market manipulation. 87 Such behaviour also includes the making of false or misleading transactions so as to give a false impression of the volume of trade in the affected securities. 88 Manipulating transactions further includes price positioning. This usually occurs when a person enters small orders into an electronic trading system at prices which are higher than the previous bid or lower than the previous offer, in order to move the price of the qualifying investments in question. 89 Fifthly, manipulating devices are also prohibited under the Financial Services and Markets Act. Accordingly, any persons who trade or place orders to trade through employing fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance will incur civil liability for market manipulation. 90 Examples of conduct that involve the use of manipulative devices include "flipping" or disclosing conflicting statements about certain qualifying investments through the Internet and engaging in transactions that are aimed at concealing the ownership of a qualifying investment to avoid compliance with the disclosure requirements. Sixthly, illicit dissemination of information is prohibited in the Financial Services and Markets Act. Put differently, an insider or any person who knowingly gives information that conveys or is likely to convey a false or misleading impression about an investment or the issuer of an investment will be liable for market manipulation. 91 Lastly, distortion and misleading behaviour is also outlawed in the Financial Services and Markets Act. In other words, any conduct that gives a false or misleading impression of either the demand for or the supply of investments and behaviour that distorts or is likely to distort the market in such investments leads to civil liability on the part of the offenders. 92 A separate civil prohibition against persons who encourage or require others to engage in market manipulation or other market abuse activities is also proscribed in the Financial Services and Markets Act. 93 The requirement or encouragement offence is committed where, by taking or refraining from taking any action, 94 a person in question has required or encouraged others to indulge in market manipulation or other related market abuse activities. This may indicate that the Financial Services and Markets Act has a broader market abuse civil prohibition than its predecessors.
Market manipulation is also treated as a criminal offence under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 95 Precisely, any person who makes misleading statements or who dishonestly conceals material facts relating to qualifying investments for the purpose of inducing or who is reckless as to whether they may induce other persons to enter or exercise or refrain from exercising any rights conferred by the relevant investments will be criminally liable for market manipulation. 96 Furthermore, engaging in misleading practices and conduct which creates a false or misleading impression in respect of the market or the value of any qualifying investments for the purposes of creating that impression and inducing other persons to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for, or underwrite such investments or to refrain from doing so is criminalised under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 97 This presupposes that misleading statements or omissions and other forms of market manipulation such as artificial transactions and trade-based manipulations are further prohibited and criminalised under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 98 Market manipulation has further been indirectly made a criminal offence under the Fraud Act. 99 This Act introduced a new general offence fraud which discourages false representations, failure to disclose non-public material inside information and fraud by abuse of position. 100 Thus, although it is most likely that violations for market manipulation or other related activities may be prosecuted under the Financial Services and Markets Act or the Criminal Justice Act, such violations may also fall under the general offence of fraud as stipulated in the Fraud Act. 101 96 
S 118(5). 88 For example, wash trades; buying qualifying investments at the close of the market to mislead investors who act at closing prices; buying and selling a specific security by persons among themselves to create an illusion (painting the tape) of high volumes of trading. 89 Other examples of price positioning involve the so-called abusive squeezes, where a person has a position (directly or indirectly) in an investment
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Evaluation and Analysis of the Historical Overview of Market Manipulation Prohibition
Although market manipulation has been discouraged in the UK from as early as the 1860s, 102 it was only statutorily prohibited in South Africa in the late 1980s. 103 Prior to this, market manipulation was mainly prohibited by the common law in South Africa. 104 In contrast to the position in the UK where the concept of, and conduct amounting to market manipulation or other market abuse practices is statutorily defined, 105 this concept is not statutorily defined in the Financial Markets Act. 106 Moreover, unlike the position in the UK where about seven types of market abuse are clearly enumerated and statutorily prohibited, only three forms of market abuse practices, namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive promises, statements or forecasts (disclosure-based market manipulation) are statutorily discouraged in South Africa. 107 Moreover, unlike the position under the Financial Markets Act, 108 the Financial Services and Markets Act treats insider trading, 109 market manipulation and other forms of market abuse practices on a more equal footing in the UK. 110 For instance, as discussed earlier, 111 market manipulation and other market abuse practices are all treated as civil or criminal offences under the Financial Services and Markets Act in the UK. This approach is desirable in that it has enabled the FSA and other enforcement authorities to enforce the market abuse prohibition consistently in order to combat market manipulation and other related practices in the UK. In view of this and notwithstanding the fact that the market manipulation victims could utilise the relevant provisions of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 112 to recover their damages, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact provisions that extends the civil liability compensation orders to cases involving market manipulation 113 in order to improve and increase the enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa. 114 Notably, behaviour would constitute market manipulation and/or other market abuse offences in terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act if it occurs in the UK or in relation to any qualifying investments which are mainly traded on a prescribed market in the UK 115 or the relevant EU member states. Thus, in order for the FSA to impose liability on the alleged offenders, there must be a territorial nexus with the relevant financial markets in the UK or elsewhere. This could imply that the UK's provisions on market manipulation and other market abuse practices have a restricted extra-territorial application. 116 However, in South Africa, conduct may amount to market manipulation or insider trading if it was made in relation to securities listed on a regulated market (whether domestic or foreign) which is run in terms of the laws of the country in which the market conducts business as a market for dealing in securities listed on that market. 117 This implies, in contrast to the position in the UK, 118 that the South African market abuse prohibition is unlimitedly applicable to securities listed on any regulated foreign market and to both natural and juristic persons. 119 However, it remains to be seen whether the South African enforcement authorities will be able to mobilise and have sufficient resources necessary to implement and enforce the prohibition on market manipulation extra-territorially. Moreover, it is not expressly and statutorily provided how this so-called extra-territorial application will be utilised to protect the South African financial markets from non-resident persons who manipulate securities listed on a foreign market where such conduct has no effect on the related securities listed on the regulated financial markets in South Africa. 120 The legislature in the UK amended its market abuse legislation in order to align it with the EU Market Abuse Directive. 121 In light of this, the FSA was conferred more powers as a single administrative regulator to ensure that the prohibition on market manipulation and related practices is consistently complied with. The FSA has, for instance, issued the Code of Market Conduct to guide all the relevant persons on conduct that amounts to market manipulation and related practices (including factors to be considered when determining whether such conduct amounts to market abuse) in the UK. 122 This Code of Market Conduct has, for instance, stipulated some factors to be considered when determining whether a person dealing in any qualifying investment has created a false or deceptive appearance of a trading activity in relation to a certain security or an artificial price or value of the qualifying investment and the extent to which the price, rate or option volatility movements for the affected investment are outside their normal daily, weekly or monthly range. 123 Although such market conduct is also prohibited by the Financial Markets Act, 124 it is not quite clear whether the Financial Services Board (the FSB) has a similar Code or booklet containing the guidelines regarding the behaviour that amounts to market manipulation or related practices in South Africa.
In addition, market manipulation practices such as the creation of a false or deceptive appearance of trading activity in connection with a security, 125 dealing that will create an artificial practice 126 and placing orders to buy or sell listed securities in order to create an artificial price for a security or a false or deceptive appearance in trading activity in relation to that security 127 are merely stated and prohibited in the Financial Markets Act. Similarly, like the UK, 128 South Africa prohibits certain conduct that is deemed manipulative, improper, false or deceptive. 129 For example, the Financial Markets Act discourages practices such as: (a) wash sales, 130 (b) engaging in conduct that amounts to or creates matched orders, 131 (c) buying orders at successively higher prices and selling such orders at successively lower prices in order to improperly influence the market prices of certain securities, 132 (d) entering orders to buy securities (marking the close) at or near the close of the market to change or maintain the close price of a listed security, 133 (e) auctioning process, 134 (f) effecting a market corner, 135 and (g) maintaining an artificial price. 136 Notably, employing manipulating devices, schemes or artifices or manipulative act, practice or course of business to defraud other investors 137 is no longer expressly outlawed under the Financial Markets Act. 138 Furthermore, in contrast to the position in the UK, disclosurebased market manipulation and/or other related activities that are perpetrated through the Internet are not statutorily prohibited in the Financial Markets Act. 139 Moreover, the Financial Markets Act does not expressly provide practical guiding factors on how to determine whether certain practices may be deemed to be amounting to market manipulation. 140
Available Penalties
Civil, criminal and administrative penalties are employed in the UK to combat and discourage market abuse practices. However, it is important to note that the discussion under this sub-heading will mainly focus on penalties as proscribed in the Criminal Justice Act and the Financial Services and Markets Act.
Criminal penalties may be imposed on all persons who knowingly engage in market abuse practices in the UK. Thus, the contravention of the insider trading provisions contained in the Criminal Justice Act 141 and other market abuse provisions contained in the Financial Services and Markets Act will give rise to criminal penalties in the UK. 142 Criminal penalties for insider trading under the Criminal Justice Act may only be imposed on individuals. 143 However, the criminal penalties for insider trading under the Financial Services and Markets Act are now applicable to both natural and juristic persons. 144 Criminal penalties that may be imposed on individuals for insider trading or market manipulation include a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both on summary conviction; or upon conviction on indictment, a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or both. 145 The perpetrators of market abuse in the UK may also be liable for civil penalties. Although these penalties apply to both juristic and natural persons under the Financial Services and Markets Act, 146 there are no civil penalties for insider trading under the Criminal Justice Act. 147 Civil penalties that may be imposed on the perpetrators (offenders) of market abuse under the Financial Services and Markets Act comprise unlimited monetary fines, 148 disgorgement of profits and/or the payment of compensation to the prejudiced persons. 149 A number of factors have to be considered when determining the appropriate amount of the fine to be imposed on the offenders. Such factors are provided for in the Financial Services and Markets Act as well as in the enforcement section of the FSA's Enforcement (Manual) Handbook. 150 The factors include the following: (a) the adverse effect of the behaviour on the market in question; (b) whether the person on whom the penalty is to be imposed is an individual or a juristic person; (c) the amount of profits accrued or loss avoided; (d) the degree to which the conduct in question was deliberate or reckless and (e) the conduct following the behaviour of the alleged offender in question. 151 With regard to the last factor, the FSA may further consider the degree of co-operation that the accused person gave during the investigations of the wrongful conduct and whether any remedial steps were taken by that person from the time that behaviour was initially identified. 152 The courts may, at the request of the FSA, further impose monetary fines on a person who violates any market abuse provisions. 153 This usually follows after an application to the court by the FSA for an injunctive or restitution relief. 154 In addition, a number of administrative penalties are used to curb market abuse in the UK. 155 For example, disciplinary sanctions such as variation of (withdrawal of authorisation) Part IV permission; 156 injunctions (including cease or desist orders) to take remedial steps, secure or freeze assets and to discourage a certain conduct. 157 These court injunctions can be imposed on any person who commits market abuse practices, regardless of whether such person is regulated by the FSA. 158 Other administrative penalties that can be levied against market abuse offenders are public censure, 159 withdrawal of approval on former approved persons who are not fit to perform their initial authorised functions, 160 prohibition of individuals who engage in illicit trading activities from dealing or carrying out functions related to regulated activities 161 and imposing restitution and redress orders on any persons who commit market manipulation and/or other market abuse offences. 162 It should be borne in mind that these administrative penalties are applicable to all persons (natural and juristic persons) especially under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 163 The Financial Services and Markets Act further confers a private right of action to the FSA to apply to the courts for a restraining order or restitution order against any person who knowingly contravenes its relevant market abuse provisions. 164 In addition, the FSA may also seek a court order against any alleged offenders to disgorge the profits gained or directly pay compensation to the persons affected by their market abuse activities. 165 Although a civil private right of action is available as indicated above to the persons who suffer losses due to other forms of market abuse, there is no such express private right of action for persons affected by market manipulation as contained in the Financial Services and Markets Act 166 and insider trading as contained in the Criminal Justice Act. 167
Evaluation and Analysis of the Available Penalties
The UK, 168 South Africa uses civil, criminal 169 and administrative penalties and/or remedies to combat market abuse practices. As is the position in the UK 170 and as indicated above, criminal and administrative penalties are used to discourage all forms of market abuse in South Africa. 171 On the other hand, civil penalties are employed only to curb insider trading under the Financial Markets Act. 172 In contrast to this position in South Africa, no civil penalties for insider trading are provided for under the Criminal Justice Act in the UK. 173 However, a number of civil penalties are now available to discourage and curb insider trading as well as other market abuse practices under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 174 With regard to criminal penalties, South Africa rigidly imposes a maximum fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment against the offenders. 175 In contrast to this, unlimited monetary and other penalties may be imposed on the offenders by the FSA in the UK. 176 As earlier discussed, 177 several factors are considered in order to determine appropriate civil monetary fines that will be imposed on the market abuse offenders in the UK. Likewise, almost similar factors are used to determine appropriate civil compensatory fines and administrative penalties in South Africa. 178 Moreover, like the UK, 179 and as already indicated above, South Africa imposes a variety of unlimited administrative penalties on persons who commit market abuse offences. 180 Additionally, like the FSA, 181 the FSB is now allowed to publish by notice on its official website or by means of other appropriate public media, any outcome, status or details of market abuse investigations (public censure) if such publication is in the public interest. 182
Concluding Remarks
As earlier stated, 183 it is submitted that the failure to provide separate and distinct penalties for companies and individuals could have marred the successful enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa to date. Accordingly, it is recommended that the FSB should be expressly and statutorily authorised to impose separate and different penalties on individuals and juristic persons or companies that engage in market abuse activities in South Africa. Put differently, the FSB should be expressly and statutorily authorised to impose separate, different and unlimited monetary and other appropriate penalties on individuals and juristic persons or companies that engage in market abuse activities in South Africa. Over and above, it is suggested that the FSB, like the FSA, 184 should carefully and consistently utilise its statutory powers to publicise the names of the culprits who commit market abuse offences (public censure or name and shame approach) in South Africa. 185 Moreover, it is submitted, as is the position in the UK, 186 that the Financial Markets Act should be reviewed to enact provisions that give private rights of action to the affected persons for them to claim their damages directly from the market abuse offenders. In relation to this, it is submitted that the FSB should be statutorily required to provide its own Code of Market Abuse Conduct containing sufficient and adequate guidelines on factors that should be considered from time to time, in determining whether a trading practice and/or behaviour will give rise to or amounts to market abuse practices in order to increase the combating of such practices in South Africa.
It is further suggested that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact provisions that expressly and adequately define the concepts of "insider trading" and "market manipulation" in South Africa. Additionally, as is the position in the UK, 187 the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact provisions that expressly discourage any market abuse activity or illicit dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter markets through agents or professional intermediaries and face-to-face transactions between non-professional intermediaries in South Africa. Lastly, the Financial Markets Act should also be reviewed to enact provisions that clearly enumerate sufficient guidelines or conditions under which the extra-territorial application of the market abuse ban will be employed to prevent cross-border market abuse activities consistently in South Africa and elsewhere. 
